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ABSTRACT
This article analyses the ways in which the state ‘treats’ addiction 
among precarious drug (ab)users in Iran. While most Muslim-majority 
as well as some Western states have been reluctant to adopt harm 
reduction measures, the Islamic Republic of Iran has done so on a 
nationwide scale and through a sophisticated system of welfare 
intervention. Additionally, it has introduced devices of management 
of ‘addiction’ (the ‘camps’) that defy statist modes of punishment 
and private violence. What legal and ethical framework has this 
new situation engendered? And what does this new situation tell us 
about the governmentality of the state? Through a combination of 
historical analysis and ethnographic fieldwork, the article analyses the 
paradigm of government of the Iranian state with regard to disorder 
as embodied by the lives of poor drug (ab)users.
‘I call the camps if someone calls me!’
Police Officer in Arak, September 2014.
I have the feeling we are crying on a grave which is empty.1 How many people, arrested for 
drug addiction and sent to compulsory camps, have actually been in front of a judge? And, 
if this has happened, had the judge said anything to them about treatment? I doubt that we 
can find ten people in the whole country who have met a judge before going to a camp, so I 
think the question here is something else and it is not related to compulsory treatment. … The 
problem, it seems to me, is that the question is not medical and therapeutic, but one of social 
and political control.
Professor Emran Razzaghi, International Addiction Studies Conference, Tehran, 10 September 
2014.
Introduction: ethnography of a policy
In the southern district of Tehran’s Bazaar, between Mowlavi Street and Shoosh Street, there 
are four public gardens. The biggest and most popular of these is Harandi Park, which stands 
at the heart of the old neighbourhood of Darvazeh Ghar. Since 2014, Harandi Park and, to a 
similar extent, the others have been lieux of encounter of large groups of drug users who 
© 2017 The author(s). Published by informa uK limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
KEYWORDS
iran 
ethnography of the state 
addiction 
civil society 
drugs 
micropolitics
ARTICLE HISTORY
received 19 February 2017 
accepted 1 July 2017
CONTACT Maziyar Ghiabi   maziyar.ghiabi@gmail.com   http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2171-2811
Present address: Postdoctoral Fellow at eheSS, Paris.
 OPEN ACCESS
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [9
4.1
62
.91
.13
7]
 at
 07
:01
 12
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
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camp there with tents, sleeping bags, bonfires and piles of cardboard on the ground. Over 
the warm seasons – between March and November – the number of street drug users resid-
ing within the perimeter of the parks and the connecting alleys reaches three to four thou-
sand, with additional visitors towards the evening spleen.2
While on a late-morning stroll across the lawn, I encountered waste collectors and gar-
deners working their way between groups of drug users, chatting or just passing through 
their circles. Every now and then, a police motorbike would ride on the main road circum-
scribing the park or in the middle of it, with not much preoccupation with the people smok-
ing heroin or shisheh, the word for methamphetamine (crystal meth) in Iran. The entrance 
of a bigger tent, close to a smelly empty pool that served as an open-air loo, was animated 
by the bustling of a dozen people. I was told later that the tent is where the main distribution 
of gart (heroin) and shisheh in the Harandi area takes place and that it is the centre of gravity 
of the park. This is not an underground, hidden site of criminality or an unseen zone of crisis/
disorder; the park stands in the middle of one of Tehran’s most popular neighbourhoods, 
which has a symbiotic relation to its great bazaar and is located close to the main metro line 
(Line 1) connecting the wealthy north with the city’s poorer southern districts. In contrast 
to the ever-lasting declarations of the ‘War on Drugs’ and the ever-increasing number of 
drug arrests, the situation in Harandi casts light on a different approach based on limited 
tolerance of public drug use and the tacit acceptance of street hustling, more or less.
Activism among civil society groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has 
attracted public attention to this place, which by 2015 had become a leitmotif of debate 
around drugs policy in Tehran. The city municipality and the mayor of the district denied 
their acceptance of the situation and reiterated that there is no plan to transform Harandi 
into a social experiment of de facto drug decriminalisation.3 A temporary alternative to the 
plans for collection of drug (ab)users, it refrains from the incarceration or forced treatment 
of the compulsory camps, which I will discuss in detail in this article. Instead, by having large 
gatherings of so-called ‘risky’ drug (ab)users concentrated in specific areas such as Harandi 
Park, social workers and medical personnel can intervene with harm reduction services (eg 
needle exchange, condom distribution, etc.) and attempt to introduce them into the cycle 
of treatment, notably methadone maintenance, even though many of these drug (ab)users 
are meth smokers or polydrug users, for whom methadone, a pharmacological opiate sub-
stitute, is not effective. The ‘dispersion of risk’ is reduced, according to public officials, who 
imply that without Harandi the whole of Tehran would be a scene of open-air drug use and 
drug hustling, with the spectre of HIV epidemics looming all too large over the populace. It 
would be uncontrollable.
This ethnographic vignette casts light on the routines and connections of everyday drugs 
policy in Iran. This article, similarly, analyses the micropolitics of ‘addiction’ policies and the 
way Iranians and the Iranian state treat drug (ab)users. (Ab)user, here, suggests the ambiguity 
that rules the definition of ‘addiction’ as a social artefact and the addict as its primary actor. 
The limit between using and abusing drugs, indeed, rests ultimately upon a judgement on 
the status of the addict; it is the outcome of legal prosecution, economic degradation and 
policing practices. While most Muslim-majority as well as some Western states have been 
reluctant to adopt welfare-oriented measures (eg harm reduction) towards drug users, the 
Islamic Republic of Iran has done so on a nationwide scale enshrined in the 2010 drug law 
reform. The article asks: What legal and ethical framework has this new situation engendered? 
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And what does this tell us about state practices with regard to zones of social disorder and 
crisis? The article does question whether Iran is a theocracy, a republic or just another author-
itarian state as it has been the subject of endless scholarly work. The article is not interested 
in ‘what is the nature of power’. Rather I discuss, following Deleuze's incitement, ‘in what 
ways power is exercised, in what place it is formed and why it is everywhere’.4 In this way the 
article shows how power works in the micropolitical dimension and how it defies top-down 
expositions of politics in the Islamic Republic.
Based on ethnographic research (immersion in the field) and more than 50 semi-struc-
tured interviews carried out between 2012 and 2016, the article analyses the grassroots 
dimension of drugs policy in Iran.5 Ultimately, what governs the lives of precarious addicts 
is not the state’s imposition of order through disciplinary mechanisms or Islamising princi-
ples. Instead, it is an assemblage of public and private means aimed at maintaining 
disorder.6
What is a ‘camp’ in Iran?
Known formally as short-term and medium-term in-patient treatment centres, these places 
are popularly known as camps. The word, rather than recalling the heinous reference to the 
Nazi concentration camps, refers to the expression camp-e tabestani, meaning ‘summer 
camps’ or ‘holiday camps’, that had become very much à la mode among middle-class Iranians 
in the 1990s.7 When the camps soon became publicly known for their dehumanising con-
ditions, the label ‘camp’ proved that destiny may sometimes be in one’s name. As the Latin 
speakers would have said, nomen omen: ‘name is destiny’.8
Adapted after the philosophy of recovery of Narcotics Anonymous (NA), the equivalent 
of Alcoholics Anonymous for drugs, the camps are based on a detoxification process, usually 
lasting for one 21- to 28-day session.9 As charitable institutions, they are under the supervi-
sion of the Welfare Organisation – the state institution (formerly a ministry) charged with 
social assistance programmes – but they cultivate a close relationship with the police. In 
fact, the private rehab camps are regularly contacted by the police in order ‘to accommodate’ 
arrested drug users for rehab programmes, whenever the state-run compulsory camps are 
overwhelmed.10 While people referred by the police to the compulsory camps are treated 
free of charge, those referred to the rehab camps are expected to pay the fees, at least par-
tially. In some cases, the Welfare Organisation covers the cost of in-patient treatment (but 
the bureaucratic process is time consuming, and its outcome uncertain). The camp owners 
admit that in no case have they demanded the full amount. They accept any monetary 
contribution the addict, or his family, is capable of making. Most of the time, however, people 
referred to private camps by the police refuse to pay and, consequently, as a camp owner 
explained me, ‘addicts are arrested by the police on Monday, and released by us [the camp 
owners] on Tuesday, because they don’t have money [to pay the fees]’.11 This has triggered 
criticism of the police, especially in view of the 2010 law reform that puts emphasis on ‘the 
judicial supervision of the arrest, treatment and release process’, which would require a 
judicial dossier to be opened for every referral. The camps are not legally required to keep 
the drug users against their will, so in the case of escape they do not take further action. 
Plus, there are no guards or police at their gates. The conservative newspaper Keyhan 
reminded the police that ‘the [private] camps have no right to maintain the addicts without 
a ruling of the judiciary; similarly they cannot let the addict leave the camp without approval 
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of the judicial authorities’.12 Both practices are the rule rather than the exception. The dossier, 
alas, is missing.
With a drug-using population which has been described as among the largest worldwide, 
counting an estimated one and a half million out of a population of 80 million, the place of 
drugs is central to Iranian politics.13 Rooted in the cultural practice of people (ie opium use), 
Iranians have also acquired a new taste for drugs as exemplified by the popularity of heroin 
and methamphetamines (shisheh). More importantly, governance of the drug question has 
resulted in the adoption of progressive, forward-looking policies, starting from the early 
2000s, despite the Islamic Republic’s uncompromising pledge to the War on Drugs. By 2005, 
the reformist government of Mohammad Khatami had introduced, under the pressure of 
an expanding HIV epidemic in prisons, a comprehensive set of ‘harm reduction’ measures. 
These included policies that remain often controversial in Europe and North America, such 
as needle exchange and distribution programmes, including in prisons (up to 2009), meth-
adone maintenance and legitimisation of rehabilitation throughout the country.14 By 2017, 
two safe injection rooms for drug users operated in Tehran (nearby the opening scene’ parks) 
as part of a pilot project aimed at gathering evidence of this alternative model of drugs 
policy. This has put Iran ahead of most countries in the world in terms of drugs policy exper-
imentation, despite a lack of reference to the Iranian case in international policy circles.
The institutions involved in the management of drugs policy are many: the Ministry of 
Public Heath oversees the work of methadone clinics; the Welfare Organisation is in charge 
of supervising the rehabilitation centres for drug addiction; and the police (Niru-ye Entezami-ye 
Jomhuri-ye Eslami, The Law Enforcement of the Islamic Republic, NAJA). Iran’s law enforce-
ment, besides their duty of countering drug dealing, have also been involved in compulsory 
treatment programmes for drug addiction. All these institutions partake in the governance 
of Iran’s umbrella organisation for illicit drugs, the Drug Control Headquarters (DCHQ), which 
operates under the mandate of the president of the republic (Figure 1).
The coexistence of multiple visions of the drug phenomenon among these institutions 
has produced a contradictory set of responses. This ambiguity is enshrined in the legal 
framework of the drugs laws, which, in light of the emergence of crystal meth, were reformed 
in 2010.
Addiction
Min. of Health
• Methadone
• Drop in Centres (DICs)
• Psychiatric treatment
• People living with HIV
Welfare Org.
• Rehab camps
• Harm Reduction 
(needle exchange, 
DICs, shelters)
Police
• Compulsory Treatment
• 'Addicts collection 
Plans'
Prison Org.
• Methadone in Prison
• Post-arrest service
Figure 1. State institutions and addiction.
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The oxymoronic laws
The 2010 drug laws reform, approved after complex negotiations within the Council for the 
Discernment of the Expediency of the State (aka Expediency Council),15 displayed the polit-
ical and legal situation of drug (ab)use, following the approval of the harm reduction policy. 
Under the populist presidency of Mahmud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013), observers expected 
a setback for the harm reduction system. However, practices of support to drug (ab)users 
continued and effectively widened their quantitative scope after 2005. By 2007, there were 
51 government facilities, 457 private outpatient centres and an additional 26 transition 
 centres.16 By 2009, there were already 1569 treatment centres, 337 government centres and 
1232 non-government centres operational throughout the country, providing services to 
643,516 persons.17 Why and how this occurred is a question that goes beyond the scope of 
this article, but, in summary, one can tell that the expansion of public health measures under 
Ahmadinejad followed the logic of privatisation, which remained a driving principle during 
his mandate in all socioeconomic fields. In addition to this, one should mention the influence 
that the medical community and the NGOs had acquired over the late 2000s. Both contrib-
uted to the legitimisation of this approach during the post-reformist period. The fact that 
harm reduction and treatment of drug abuse had been included in the text of the General 
Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, emanating from the Expediency Council and approved 
directly by the Supreme Jurist Ali Khamenei, surely contributed to this process.18
The 2010 law reform materialised also the idiosyncrasies of the politics of drugs in the 
twenty-first century. The law itself provides a localised example of the paradigm of govern-
ment with regard to the crises of drug (ab)use that the post-reformist government had faced. 
Firstly, the 2010-reformed law legitimised harm reduction practices that had been practiced 
since the early 2000s, by including them into an institutional order. Secondly, the law insti-
tuted specific centres for the implementation of harm reduction and rehab centres; these 
include state-run centres and private clinics as well as charitable and grassroots organisa-
tions. More crucially, the 2010 law established a distinction between those drug (ab)users 
who are willing to seek treatment and, indeed, to refer to a recognised institution (eg clinic, 
camp), and those who do not seek treatment, who therefore can be subjected to arrest. It 
also introduced the death penalty for people carrying more than 30 g of amphetamine-type 
stimulants (ATS). The line that divides the status of the categories remained thin and highly 
ambiguous. The reform produced an oxymoronic law.
The provisions of the 2010 law seemed to respond, in fact, to the necessities materialised 
by the expanding crisis of methamphetamine that had surfaced in public spaces. Public 
officials during the late 2000s agreed that people addicted to meth could not be cured, or 
that a cure for them was either unavailable or too expensive to be provided on a large scale.19 
Meth users tend to be more mobile compared to people using heroin, who tend to ‘chill’ in 
a quiet place in contemplation of the spell of time. Iranian meth users had therefore a visible 
presence in the city, which caused concern among the law and order cadres as well as the 
public (Figure 2).20
This persuasion may have convinced the cadres of the state to seek mechanisms of inter-
vention that were not necessarily coherent with each other, but which, from a state perspec-
tive, responded to the imperatives of public order. Pharmacological substitution programmes 
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6   M. GHIABI
(methadone) and harm reduction practices (needle exchange) were inadequate to respond 
to the treatment of meth users. The medical community had expressed its impotency regard-
ing the wave of meth use over the early 2010s, a fact that had implications also for the way 
the police needed to counter the issue. A lack of medicalised solutions implied that the 
practice of isolation and confinement became the primary response. This time, however, it 
was not through incarceration in state prisons, as had been the case since 1979, but through 
the work of different agents: state-run compulsory centres, private rehab and informal treat-
ment camps.
Figure 2. Meanwhile on the Tehran Metro: a shisheh smoker.
Note: This photograph circulated widely in September 2015 among Telegram app users. i received it in the drugs policy group 
(which includes leading members of the drugs policy community) ‘The Challenges of addiction’.
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Humanitarian security
Since the implementation of the 2010 reform, the state had regularly intervened to collect 
street addicts and had confined them to compulsory camps, much to the astonishment of 
those who had worked towards the legitimation of harm reduction.21 The category of people 
targeted by these operations are the unemployed proletariat, a wageless class of mendicants, 
petty robbers, petty dealers, garbage collectors and ex-prisoners who fall outside the moral 
order of modern society and its political economy.22 In reality, part of the medical community 
and NGO sector had supported the text of the 2010 law on the basis that it legitimised harm 
reduction and proceeded towards a decriminalisation of addiction. The compulsory treat-
ment camps, supporters of the 2010 law argued, were the necessary venue to medicalise 
addiction among those categories of (ab)users who could not be persuaded to seek treat-
ment. It would be, they added, the safest way to introduce the addict into the cycle of 
treatment, thus facilitating his/her recovery.23 Yet the state-run camps often exposed situa-
tions of degradation, which prompted several officials to express publicly their opposition 
to this model, on the grounds that it neither brought results nor offered humanitarian 
support.
The origins of this institutional model can be traced back to the early years of the 
Ahmadinejad government. In 2007, already, the new head of the Drug Control Headquarters, 
Commander-in-Chief Ahmad-Moghaddam, announced that ‘the addict must be considered 
a patient-criminal who, if he is not under treatment, the court will rule for him compulsory 
treatment and the police will be the executor of a police-based treatment’. He then added, 
‘we have to build maintenance camps; the police has already built camps for the homeless 
addicts and vagrants, which in the opinion of treatment officials can be used as maintenance 
camps for addicts for a certain period (emphasis added)’.24 This announcement can be con-
sidered an ante tempore elucidation of the 2010 law model. The continuity among home-
lessness, vagrancy and addiction is exemplified in the circumstances preceding Tehran’s 
Non-Alignment Summit in summer 2012. Ahead of the official visit of 120 state representa-
tives, the police rounded up several thousand homeless people through the ‘addict collection 
programme’.25 Regardless of whether they were also drug users, the status of homelessness 
triggered the intervention of the police in cleansing the public space.
The fact that, genealogically, the compulsory treatment camps were formerly camps for 
the internment of vagrants and homeless people revealed the primary concern of the state 
with regard to the management of the public (dis)order and the lumpen classes of the cities.26 
Much like in the 1980s, the officials adopted a language that emphasised the need to ‘quar-
antine’ problematic drug (ab)users, which had previously been addressed to the street 
vagrants,27 Yet this rhetoric did not anticipate a return to past forms of intervention; the 
post-reformist ‘quarantine’, instead, envisaged the presence and ‘supervision of doctors, psy-
chologists, psychiatrists and infection experts as well as social workers’ and the referral, after 
the period of mandatory treatment, of maintenance, to ‘the non-state sector, NGOs and 
treatment camps’.28 This was largely discussed and never fully implemented. The rationale, 
it was argued, was to introduce ‘dangerous addicts’ and risky groups into the cycle of treat-
ment, the first of which were managed by the state, through the ‘therapeutic police’, the law 
enforcement in charge of addiction treatment in the state-run camps.
After the approval of the 2010 law, large budgetary allocations were made by the gov-
ernment to the police in furtherance to the construction of compulsory camps. In 2011, ca. 
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8   M. GHIABI
USD 8 million was allocated to the Ministry of Interior,29 with the objective to build a major 
compulsory treatment camp in Fashapuyieh, in the southern area of the capital Tehran. This 
first camp was designed to intern in the first phase around 4000 addicts (with no clear criteria 
of inclusion), with the number going up to 40,000 when the entire camp had been com-
pleted.30 Other camps were expected to operate in Iran’s major regions, including Khorasan, 
Markazi, Fars and Mazandaran.31 The deputy director of the DCHQ, Tah Taheri, announced 
that ‘about 250,000 people needed to be sent to the compulsory treatment camps by the 
end of the year’ as part of the governmental effort to curb the new dynamics of addiction.32 
The ambitious plan had the objective, among other things, of unburdening the Prison 
Organisation from the mounting number of drug offenders, a move likely to benefit also the 
finances of the judiciary and the police, always overwhelmed by drug dossiers.
Yet the nature of the compulsory treatment camps resembles that of the prisons. After 
all, Iran’s drug legislation included a provision that required the separation of drug-related 
criminals from the rest of the prison population.33 This plan, which had been given support 
over the years, had never materialised on a large scale, leaving the prisons filled with drug 
offenders.34 By 2010, the prison population in Iran had increased to 250,000 inmates,35 equiv-
alent to ca. 312 prisoners for every 100,000 people. The rate of incarceration remained sig-
nificantly lower than that of the US and Russia, the top incarcerators worldwide, which 
counted 716 inmates per 100,000 and 415 per 100,000, respectively.36 But given that drug 
offences constituted the prime cause of incarceration in Iran, around 50 to 70%,37 the ratio 
speaks of the centrality of incarceration within the national drugs strategy.
Mostafa Purmohammadi, a prominent Iranian prosecutor,38 identified ‘addicted prisoners’ 
as one of the main concerns of the national prisons, and advised that the country needed 
to implement the mandatory treatment camps in order to alleviate the dangers and troubles 
of the prison system.39 Consequently, for the first time in many decades, Iran’s prison pop-
ulation had decreased by some 40,000 people in 2012, reaching the still-cumbersome num-
ber of 210,000 inmates. This datum, heralded as evidence of success by the post-reformist 
government, could be actually traced back to the introduction, on a massive scale, of the 
compulsory camps for drug addicts. In light of this consideration, the population confined 
in state institutions for charges of criminal behaviour (including public addiction) had actu-
ally mounted to almost double the number in prisons prior to 2010s.
Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the overall number of prisoners had 
multiplied by six times, and the number of those incarcerated for drug-related charges by 
14 times, with one in three court cases allegedly being drug related in 2009.40 If during the 
reformist period the introduction of harm reduction had been prompted, among other 
things, from the HIV epidemic in prisons,41 the post-reformist government reacted with 
public outrage against the waste of money that the incarceration of drug addicts repre-
sented. In 2010, an official from the Prison Organisation outlined that maintenance costs 
were ca. US$1 per day per person, equivalent to 1.5 million per day, ca. 0.058% of the national 
budget (2009/2010).42 Researchers from state institutions demonstrated that treating drug 
addicts would cost an average of 15 times less than incarcerating them.43 In view of the 
number of drug (ab)users in prison, the creation of the compulsory treatment camps pro-
vided an alternative device for the maintenance and management of this population. The 
head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Sadegh Ardeshir Amoli Larijani, echoed these results, asking 
for a swift re-settling of addicted prisoners in the compulsory camps for treatment, which, 
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instead of being under the supervision of the Prison Organisation, are managed by the 
DCHQ.44
At the same time, the government proceeded towards a significant expansion of meth-
adone treatment, bringing treatment to more than 40,000 prisoners by 2014. Methadone, 
in this regard, represented an acceptable solution, as it was produced and controlled by the 
state, it was readily available through private and public clinics, and it greatly facilitated – by 
virtue of its pharmacological effects – the management of unruly subjects, such as drug 
addicts, in the contexts of prisons. Inspired by the relative success of these methadone 
programmes (in prisons, as much as outside), methadone treatment programmes were 
introduced inside some of the compulsory treatment camps supervised by the police. This, 
it seems, was identified as a productive way to introduce the highest numbers of drug 
abusers into the cycle of treatment, via allegedly less harmful drugs such as methadone. By 
familiarising arrested drug (ab)users with methadone, and by referring them to public meth-
adone clinics, the authorities sought to keep them off more dangerous drugs, such as 
heroin.
Compulsory camps have also been part of the political economy of addiction in the Islamic 
Republic. By collecting, on a regular basis, street addicts from across the cities’ hotspots, 
especially in the capital Tehran, the police benefit from a substantial financial flow, justified 
by the expenses that it putatively incurs in managing the camps. Given that most of the 
state-run camps are known for their Spartan and down-to-earth conditions and services, it 
is implied that considerable amounts of money are filling the coffers of the police. This also 
implies that the police has a stake in the continuation of the activities of the compulsory 
camps and in the seasonal intervention aimed at gathering so-called ‘dangerous drug 
addicts’. The rationale behind this system is similar to that behind the instrumental arrests 
by the French police of ‘illegal migrants’ and ‘potheads’, or in the bonus/arrest cycle governing 
local policing in the US.45 Similar procedures operate in these different contexts, where the 
public presence of drug users justifies budgetary expansion for the police, out of the politics 
of police arrest numbers.
The camps embody a new mode of law enforcement, one which, instead of contesting 
public health interventions (eg harm reduction), uses its rhetoric and for reasons that are 
not ultimately humanitarian. It is a form of humanitarian security, or, using Didier Fassin’s 
oxymoron, ‘compassionate repression’.46 This strategy emphasised a management and main-
tenance of disorderly populations through coercive mechanisms, while leaving the larger 
group of drug (ab)users unbothered. But only a tiny portion of social disorder is targeted 
through the compulsory camps and the police.
‘I can check on the girls when I am not here!’
The mechanisms of intervention in the field of addiction have been more multifaceted than 
that of state-run camps. In fact, state-run camps entered this field alongside societal organ-
isations that had set foot in the period preceding 2010. Rehabilitation centres have been 
operating legally or informally since the mid-1980s, although their extraordinary expansion 
can be traced back to the early 2000s and the new politico-medical atmosphere brought in 
by the reformists.47 Despite the promise of monetary subsidies from the state, most of the 
camps exist within an economy of subsistence based on donations from local communities, 
recovered addicts and mosques, and government cheques.
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Official statistics reported in newspapers in the last decade reveal that one in 10 addicts 
in Iran is female.48 Yet there are also strong indications that a growing number of women 
are using crystal meth, which would logically imply that the percentage of female users has 
increased in the last decade. Women represent only 5% of all referrals to state institutions 
providing service for drug abuse, but a much higher presence is revealed in formal and 
informal treatment camps.49 The stigma for women is also more pervasive and, in several 
cases, female treatment camps have been set on fire because these camps were deemed 
immoral and ‘nest[s] of sexual vice’.50 Most of these places operate at the margins of the city, 
or inside apartments in popular neighbourhoods, in order to avoid being recognised as 
camps. No outdoor indication or explicit address is provided and the referrals occur through 
the state line of enquiry – ie the police – or through informal connections, via the family. 
Thence, the female treatment camps operate along those margins in which state intervention 
is rendered more problematic by the sensibility of gender issues, while popular resentment 
and stigma against them menaces their public presence. The state, for that matter, is reticent 
to allocate sufficient licences for the female camps, out of concern that the mushrooming 
of these institutions – once formally recognised by the state – would stipulate a less ambig-
uous datum of female drug (ab)use, one which might refute the static officialdom to which 
the government has hitherto pledged. In this way, it also secures flexibility in its cooperation 
with civil society. This condition marks more explicitly female drug (ab)users, but it also 
affects the phenomenon of treatment as a whole.
In 2011, the government approved the construction of one compulsory treatment camp 
for female addicts, to be located in the Persian Gulf region of Hormozgan. The site would 
host multiple categories of ab(users) whose common feature is their relation to the street 
(and the moral order): runaway girls trapped in drug abuse, streetwalkers, sex workers, female 
mendicants, and petty drug dealers and users. All these categories blur into each other, at 
least if one sees like a state.51 The location itself indicated that the site of this camp had to be 
peripheral; south along the coast of Hormozgan, the camp would work half as a public exile 
and half as a refuge from the public gaze. Hormozgan itself, however, had historically been 
characterised by heavy drug (ab)use, including among women, a fact that perhaps further 
justified the location of the camp there. The particularity of this project was also its nature 
as a joint venture between the state and a private organisation expected to manage the 
centre, an exception both to the 2010 law and to the practice in other camps.52 Given the 
ethical challenges of running a state-run treatment camp for women, the authorities partly 
disengaged from its routine administration and partly took advantage of the existing exper-
tise and activism of NGOs dedicated for precarious women’s affairs.53 Yet a single female 
camp, located at the very periphery of Iran, could not comply with the necessities dictated 
by growing meth use among women. This void had been already filled by the establishment 
of female treatment camps, managed by private individuals or charities. I shall refer to one 
of them in particular, to which I was given repeated access over the course of my ethno-
graphic fieldwork in 2014: the women’s camp situated in the city of Arak.
Operating as a sister branch of a male camp, the female camp could hardly be described 
as a camp. In reality, it was an apartment inside a four-storey building in a formerly mid-
dle-class area (mostly inhabited by public employees), today referred to generally as pay-
in-shahr, ‘downtown’ (in Persian, it indicates ‘a popular periphery’). The apartment has three 
rooms and a small kitchen, with a long corridor used by the girls as a lounge to watch satellite 
TV (which is formally banned in Iran). The director had a number of close-circuit TV (CCTV) 
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cameras installed in the apartment and has access to the video on her laptop; she could 
control the three rooms of ‘the camp’ from the desk of her office, or when she was at home, 
via an online application to which the CCTV cameras are connected. ‘In this way’, she 
explained, ‘I can check on the girls when I am not here’. She argued that the camp is self-man-
aged by the girls themselves, who cook, clean and take care of the daily management of the 
place. They have a friendly, intimate relationship, she held, and she would like the place to 
be as comfortable and welcoming as possible for them. The door at the entrance of the 
apartment, nonetheless, has to remain locked at all times when she is not in; ‘otherwise the 
girls might run away and might go back to use drugs’. When I asked her ‘What if a person 
inside the apartment feels sick or needs urgent help?’ she justified this by saying that she 
can be reached at any time via mobile phone and that she checks on them regularly via the 
CCTV. She also relied on one of the girl in particular, Samira, who helped her by doing the 
grocery shopping and checking on the other girls while the director is away. Samira had 
been in the camp for a year and a half, since she was referred there by the female prison 
organisation. She had spent time in prison on several occasions for meth possession, aggres-
sion, armed robbery and ‘moral crimes’ (a euphemism for alleged sex work). Whether insti-
tutionalisation in this private camp had produced positive effects on her life is hard to say; 
certainly, she and I had the perception that her existence was suspended and that, despite 
the fact that she had stopped using drugs, addiction was still very much present in her life. 
In a way, this was nothing extraordinary: ‘I do not smoke anymore’, like ‘I do not drink any-
more’, is part of the experience of people suffering from addiction, of the eternally ‘recovering 
addict’.54
The fee for a 21-day period is ca. US$110, which is one third of Iranians’ average monthly 
salary (ca. US$470).55 The people coming to the camp, as I discovered, did not live in Arak 
but usually came from other cities, since they wanted to avoid being recognised by their 
communities. This small apartment in particular had two girls from Khorramabad, a Kurdish 
woman from Kermanshah and another from Khuzistan. Three of the girls were interned in 
the camp as part of a compulsory treatment programme and were sent to the camp by the 
police. Since there is just one compulsory treatment camp for women – located at ca. 120 
km from Arak – the authorities rely on private camps to accommodate these women, in 
which case they also pay the fees for their treatment. Generally, the director explains, the 
women referred by the police are more problematic, some of whom manifest serious health 
issues, while others have several criminal charges pending in their dossiers. One of them 
confided to me that the doctor had diagnosed her with skizofrenì (‘schizophrenia’) and asked 
me whether it was curable or not. It is not rare for these camps to refuse to take people 
referred by the police, out of fear of health contagion or in order to preserve their 
reputation.
The maintenance of order in the camp can indeed be troublesome. In the past, one of 
the women assaulted the director and threatened her with a knife. She was able to react, 
get a hold of the situation, and beat the woman, who had threatened her, under her feet. 
The director was condemned by the judge for her violent behaviour towards women interned 
in the camp. The camp was closed down for few months, before obtaining another licence 
under her husband’s organisation, which, I came to discover, is also a rehab camp for male 
addicts.56 The camp guaranteed a venue for ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ of female (ab)users who 
would otherwise be imprisoned. This does not imply that there is a statist strategy of covert 
manipulation through these organisations. Instead, this and other rehab centres operated 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [9
4.1
62
.91
.13
7]
 at
 07
:01
 12
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
12   M. GHIABI
as rhizomes of the state, a form of ‘government at distance’ of the drug phenomenon – a 
management of disorder.57
State of camouflage and subterfuge
It has become common knowledge – if not a joke! – that contemporary Iranian society offers 
a wide range of informal, illegal centres for the provision of services (eg retirement houses, 
pharmacies, education centres), and that despite the government’s repetitive calls for their 
closure, these enterprises continue a lucrative existence.58 But the sheer quantitative dimen-
sion of the illegal addiction camps – nine out 10 rehab camps – signifies that this category 
affects more largely and, perhaps, categorically the phenomenon itself. Indeed, one could 
say that legal treatment camps in Iran are marginalia within the page of treatment. The 
phenomenon of camps suggests that these institutions, regardless of their public/private, 
legal/illegal status, exist in a continuum. Together they constitute a primary means of inter-
vention – or mode of government – of addiction. Already in 2007, the government warned 
against the mushrooming of illegal camps and gave an ultimatum of three months to all 
camp managers to register for a licence at the Welfare Organisation.59 The DCHQ announced 
that ‘by the end of the year, the problem of the camps will be solved’,60 yet in 2014, the 
number of these institutions was higher than ever, with a veritable burgeoning across the 
country.
In Tehran alone, there were more than 400 illegal camps,61 while in Isfahan, out of 300 
camps, only 16 had a licence.62 In the city of Arak, where I conducted part of my fieldwork, 
there were about 50 illegal camps, located near villages or main routes, or in private houses.63 
These camps provide the opportunity for treatment for people and their families whose 
economic possibilities are limited. With the burden of economic sanctions being trickled 
down to popular strata, treatment in these institutions represented a more affordable and 
down-to-earth solution. Given the rootedness of the illegal camps, public officials started 
to change their approach, describing the camps as ‘a positive sign, because it implies that 
many people in Iran seek treatment’.64 As the country’s treatment capacity could not exhaust 
the demand for treatment, the officials hold, the camps are instrumental in this endeavour, 
even when they operate illegally.65
In the management of addiction, however, their role bypasses the logic of treatment and 
service provision. One could define the illegal camps using a Persian idiomatic expression: 
‘the hand that captures the snake [dast-e mar-gir]’. Exclusively legal, bureaucratic or admin-
istrative means are deemed, according to the post-reformist governmentality, insufficient 
and ineffective. To ‘treat’ addiction, hence, the state exploits the extra-legal function of the 
camps in areas from which the state itself had progressively disengaged, or has dissimulated 
its presence. The workings of the illegal camps can be sketched as such. In a situation when 
someone acts violently and volatilely, usually under the influence of meth, the family of the 
subject usually opts for the intervention of the camp personnel. This is regarded as a pref-
erable option to the intervention of the police. By calling the illegal camp, the family avoids 
criminal charges, which could produce incarceration and time-consuming lawsuits, all of 
which cause greater economic burden to the family itself. Similarly, the intervention of the 
camp ‘thugs’ guarantees a lower profile for the family than that of the police, which, especially 
in popular neighbourhoods, can cause rumours and reputation damage (aka aberurizi).66
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The police, too, seem to support the illegal camp system and, at times, inform the per-
sonnel of the camps about the location of the complaint. In this way, the camps take on the 
duties of the police, with regard to drug (ab)use.67 A police officer confirmed this informally 
during a conversation:
I am really happy that these camps exist; if a family calls us, instead of sending a soldier or a 
policeman, we call one of the people from the camps. So, if someone gets beaten, that’s the 
camp people, which also means that, if someone has to beat someone else, it’s always the camp 
people [and not the police]. Instead of taking the addict here to the police station, where he 
might vomit, feel sick and make the entire place dirty, he goes to the camp. Instead of coming 
here to shout and beat up people, or to bring diseases, HIV, he goes there. I call the camp if 
someone calls me.68
The camps are, thus, an apparatus of management of social crises and maintenance of dis-
order in the guise of addiction. De facto, many of the illegal treatment camps operate as 
compulsory treatment camps, because those secluded in them, for periods varying between 
21 days and one year, have been forced into the camps. They have been forced not by the 
police, but by their local communities – usually their family members. The police play the 
part of the observer or the informant; they inform the camps, on some occasions, of the 
location and situation of a complaint, but no formal undertaking is initiated.
Inside the camps – several personal stories disclose – the managers adopt ‘alternative 
techniques’ for the treatment of addiction, the most infamous ones being ‘beating-treatment’, 
‘water-treatment’, ‘dog-treatment’ and ‘chain-treatment’.69 Although there is generally a pro-
pensity towards sensationalising these accounts, the horrid accounts from inside the camps 
are telling about the lack of humanitarian purpose behind the workings of the camps. As in 
the case of the state-run Shafaq camp, which became the focus of a scandal in the 2010s, 
the deaths of interned addicts is the public signature of the camps’ practice.70 In 2016, all 
women were dismissed from the Shafaq centre, amidst allegations of violence.71
The liability for the crime remains exclusively with the camp managers, as noted in the 
statement of the police officer mentioned above. Camp managers are punished severely for 
casualties within the illegal camps. The state authorities have resorted, according to Islamic 
law, to qesas, retributive justice (‘an eye for an eye’), envisaging the death penalty for the 
camp managers (specifically in case the family of the victim refuses to accept the ‘blood 
money’).72 Although there are no clear data on the rate of deaths within the illegal camps, 
the reports in the newspapers suggest that these events have not been only sporadic 
between 2012 and 2016.
Among street drug (ab)users, the narratives of some of these camps gained mythological 
dimensions and instil vivid fear, a sentiment that is somehow reminiscent of a persecution. 
In this way, the camps fulfil a double promise: on the one hand, they intervene along the 
problematic margins of Iranian society (its ‘uncivil’ society), through the creation of extra-le-
gal, unaccountable and, in view of their quantitative dimension, omnipresent institutions. 
They reduce the work of the police, while receiving nothing in exchange from the state. On 
the other hand, the camps are managed by former drug users, whose place within normative 
society remains unsettled. They struggle to find employment in regular businesses, and their 
housing status remains uncertain, and they often rely on temporary family accommodation; 
the camp, hence, becomes the only stable unit within their life, functioning as both occu-
pation and residence. The post-reformist government succeeded in its quest ‘to socialise the 
war on drugs’ and to mobilise, by other means, civil society for statist ends.73 It is not, however, 
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a co-option of civil society, which remains autonomous and unburdened by governmental 
diktats. In fact, this mobilisation does not prop up, as a grand strategy, any macropolitical 
agenda. With the camps providing motivation and an ecosystem in which to find their place 
within society, the camp owners rehearse a system in which the phenomenon of drug (ab)
use dissolves into the machinery of treatment. Former (ab)users are employed in them and, 
whether willingly or involuntarily, mistreat other ‘addicts’, along the lines of previous secu-
ritising policies against drug users. This phenomenon is a form of ‘grassroots authoritarian-
ism’,74 whereby social elements belonging to societal milieux of diverse nature partake in 
mechanisms of control, discipline and treatment fundamentally maintaining disorder. The 
camps’ relationship with the state remains ambiguous, based on rhetorical condemnation 
by public officials, haphazard prosecution by the judiciary, and clandestine connections, for 
instance in the referral of complaints by the police to the illegal camps.
The multitude of illegal treatment camps hints at another statist rationale. Licences for 
these camps can be provided by the state through the Welfare Organisation; but in order to 
do so, the government needs to guarantee minimum financial support, which given the 
large number of these centres would drain the budget from other treatment programmes, 
notably the compulsory treatment camps. ‘The closure of the illegal treatment camps is not 
part of the main policy of the state’, declared a public official in a conference, adding that 
‘the existence of these camps is better than their non-existence, because their closure would 
mean disorder among the dangerous addicts’.75 In view of their indirect connection to the 
police, which sees them as a useful complement vis-à-vis problematic users, these institutions 
can be interpreted as part of the state effect. Despite their private and unrecognised status, 
they perform a public, state-sanctioned role.76
Despite almost a decade of reiterated calls to close the doors of the illegal treatment 
camps, these institutions maintain solid roots and operate, qua rhizomes, across the margins 
of rural and urban Iran. Their ubiquity has given rise to the phenomenon of kamp-gardi, 
‘camp-touring’, which refers to the unending journey of the addict from camp to camp, a 
circumnavigation that rarely has a way out and often leads to the destitution of the individual, 
or to their incorporation in the activities of a particular camp.77 Those whose experiences 
have been more telling are often called by the rest of the community of the camps the ‘Marco 
Polo’, because they have visited as many camps as the Venetian traveller had done during 
his travels of the Milione.
There is no spelled-out policy about the role of illicit rehab camps, but the daily routines 
of drugs policy reproduce what works as a maintenance assemblage. It is at the level of 
micropolitics that this condition is best captured, as illustrated above. The camps operate 
as a rhizome of the state, which instead of reproducing vertical lines of control and discipline, 
becomes diffused and horizontal – similar to the grassroots (rhizomes) of a tree. When soci-
etal control is practiced, this is cropped out through the rhizomes that stem from the hori-
zontal roots of the state itself, camouflaged as other forms of intervention, the illegal world 
of treatment dealing with the illegal life of drugs users. This forms what I define as maintaining 
disorder (Figure 3).78
Conclusions: maintaining disorder
There is no fundamental rupture, or watershed, among the state-run compulsory camps, 
the informal, illegal camps and the Harandi Park model (Table 1). Together they fulfil an 
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ultimately political objective in reaction to a phenomenon that has permanently been framed 
as a crisis. Because of that, the rehab camps enter a field of interest to the state – one could 
say an expediency – in which the underlying rule is the maintenance of disorder, the man-
agement of a permanent crisis, an ordinary emergency embodied in the presence of drugs 
users. It is not, as one would expect in the Islamic Republic, a matter of moral evaluation, 
religious justification or variation in (post-)Islamist change. Islam and theological consider-
ations do not have a place in this matter and, in fact, found no place in the narratives 
described in this article.
There are other social fields where what the article demonstrated for drugs can be similarly 
ascertained. Here are a few cursory examples: Iranian authorities, based on religious inter-
pretation, allow and actively sponsor so-called ‘temporary marriages’ (sigheh in Farsi), while 
de jure punishing premarital sex. Temporary marriage is a contractual agreement (as all 
marriage is according to Islamic jurisprudence) in which the two parties determine before-
hand the duration of the marital bond. In practice, temporary marriage has resulted in the 
tolerance of sex work, especially in sites of religious pilgrimage (Qom, Mashhad), but has 
also become an expedient for people not willing to engage in a permanent union.79
Similarly, since the late 1980s, the authorities have legislated in favour of gender reas-
signment surgery (sex change), legalising and providing welfare support for people who 
want to change gender, while denying legal status to homosexuals.80 This has gained the 
Islamic Republic a reputation as a leading centre for sex change surgery worldwide.
Figure 3. The state and its rhizomes.
Note: drawing courtesy of italian artist Fruk (aka Federica di Violante).
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In its ethical dilemma and political incongruence, the drugs and addiction question resem-
bles the above-mentioned cases, for the Islamic Republic has systematically criminalised 
drug offenders and punished them with draconian measures, while it has also provided one 
of the most progressive and controversial sets of public health programmes for drug (ab)
users. In quantitative scope, however, the drugs case is far more conspicuous and mainstream 
than the issues of sex work and sex change. As seen in the narratives of the article, main-
taining disorder, instead of imposing order, had governed the logics of public interventions 
on drugs. This approach prompts limited tolerance of public drugs use – and the life of 
‘addicts’ – in the case of Harandi Park as well as in the existence of illegal treatment camps, 
where their life is subject to informal control. The contradictions and articulations of this 
assemblage ultimately show the primacy of political prerogatives over ideological 
lineages.
This frame of analysis may prove useful for the understanding of political processes at 
large: in the tolerance of opposition and dissent within ambiguous limits of institutional 
politics; in the dynamics of clerical opposition within the Islamic Republic; and in the enforce-
ment of public codes of conduct, as related to the hijab. In this article, maintaining disorder 
defined the governmental approach to the drug crisis but also the state’s ideology of practice. 
Table 1. rehabilitation ‘camps’. 
State run Private Illegal
legal status legislated under article 16 of 
the 2010 drug law.
legislated under article 15 of 
the 2010 drug law.
illegal.
Management Managed by the NaJa, with 
support from the Welfare 
organisation, Ministry of 
health.
Managed by private 
organisations, charities, 
associations, etc.
Managed by private 
individuals, or group of 
people.
Funding receive direct state funding, 
through dChQ.
No direct funding from the 
state. Fees are applied for 
treatment periods of ca. 
21 days. donations from 
families. Subsidies from 
Welfare organisation per 
treated addict.
No subsidies or governmental 
funding. Fees apply per 
person. donations from local 
communities. Negotiations 
for poor families.
Personnel Social workers, police officers, 
medical professionals (on 
paper). in practice, police 
and local aides.
Former drug users; Na 
members; social workers and 
volunteers.
Former and current users.
Methods detoxification; in some 
facilities, methadone 
substitution is provided. 
Narcotics Anonymous (Na) 
support potentially available.
detoxification, mostly based 
on Na 12 steps; some 
organisations adopt specific 
therapies, eg music therapy, 
meditation.
detoxification, also through 
violent means and coercion.
Target group Street drug users; homeless 
drug users; Patoqs. Polydrug 
users.
depends on the organisation; 
mostly, lowermiddle-class 
drug users, both urban and 
rural. in specific cases, 
upper-class people.
Poor drug users, young 
people, men under 
psychotic attacks; mostly 
shisheh and polydrug users.
Means of referral arrests. Police operations, drug 
addicts’ round-up plans. 
Coercive.
Voluntary referral, through 
advertisement, word of 
mouth.
Family, community referral; 
police referral. Mostly 
coercive.
Fees Free. Set fees (government decree); 
often negotiated.
Flexible fees, based on status, 
negotiation.
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This art operates at the level of fabrication, make-believe and execution, confuting the 
notional existence of law and the state, as seen in the case of the camps and the park. In 
intervening on the phenomenon of drug (ab)use, the Islamic Republic envisioned its modus 
operandi as one based on secular pillars of management. The result has been a paradigm 
of government that deals with social crisis and ethical disorder without the objective of 
solving it, or of imposing a strict script on it. Instead, what is distinctive is the engendering 
grey area of state control/repression/compassion in dealing with precarious lives. This grey 
area situates Iran’s case in the global grey areas of the immigration detention centres, the 
homeless shelters, the terrorist detainees’ camps. Seen this perspective, maintaining disorder 
is not specific to Iran, but is a paradigm of government in the current epoch.
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Notes
1.  A Persian proverb equivalent to ‘Don’t count your chickens before they hatch’.
2.  Accounts of Harandi Parks also appeared in newspapers. See Iran, October 5, 2015.
3.  This model could potentially develop into something similar to Sao Paulo’s De Braços Abertos 
project in Crackolandia; see Prefertura da Cidade de São Paulo, ‘O Programa do Braços Abertos’, 
available at https://www.prefeitura.sp.gov.br/cidade/secretarias/upload/saude/DBAAGO2015.
pdf
4.  Deleuze, Due Regimi di Folli e Altri Scritti, 3.
5.  See Garcia, Pastoral Clinic; Zigon, HIV Is God’s Blessing; Raikhel and Garriott, Addiction Trajectories.
6.  Similarly, a police officer during the Great 8 (G8) in Genoa in 2001 asserted that the government 
did not want the police to establish order, but to maintain the disorder. Reported by Agamben, 
“Comment l’Obsession Sécuritaire Fait Muter.”
7.  I am grateful to Fariba Adelkhah for pointing out this aspect.
8.  This is different from the French case described by Fassin, where activists as well as Sarkozy 
himself who opposed these places used the word ‘camp’ instead of ‘centre’ to delegitimise them. 
In Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 133–4.
9.  Rehabilitation in these centres follows the 12-step process established by NA. Most of the camp 
managers and assistants are also members of NA and the camps often have logos and banners 
indicating their affiliation to the NA superstructure. Based on ethnographic observations in 
rehab camps in several Iranian cities, 2012–2016.
10.  Interview with the manager of a camp in the village around Arak, 2 April 2014.
11.  Interview in Hasanabad, April 3, 2014.
12.  Keyhan, June 10, 2012.
13.  This is the official government data and it has been stable over the last few decades, despite 
significant changes in the drug market and evidence of a rise in drugs use. There are other 
estimates, at times declared by government officials themselves, which refer to higher numbers, 
eg 2–5 million; see United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Drug Prevention 
Treatment and HIV AIDS,” https://www.unodc.org/islamicrepublicofiran/drug-prevention-
treatment-and-hiv-aids.html
14.  Ghiabi, “Drugs, Addiction and the State,” chapter 6.
15.  All Iranian legislations are discussed in Parliament with the exception of drug laws, which are 
legislated exclusively in the Expediency Council.
16.  Calabrese, “Iran’s War on Drugs.”
17.  DCHQ, “Drug Control in 2009.”
18.  The text of the General Policies can be found on the website of the Expediency Council, available 
at https://maslahat.ir/DocLib2/Approved%20Policies/Offered%20General%20Policies.aspx
19.  Interview with Tahernokhost, Tehran, September 2012; and interview with Emran Razzaghi, 
Tehran, September 2012.
20.  For instance, the increase of reckless driving and lunatic behaviour in public, described in 
journalistic pieces, hints at this. See Aftab-e Yazd, August 30, 2008. For stories about shisheh, 
which went viral, see Mehr, December 22, 2012, available at https://www.mehrnews.com/
news/1770270/; and Sharq, November 3, 2013, available at https://sharghdaily.ir/1392/08/14/
Files/PDF/13920814-1874-22-12.pdf
21.  These operations are usually called nejat, ‘salvation’, and prior to 2010 they contemplated 
incarceration for short periods.
22.  In the presidential election of May 2017, the issue of marginalisation became a central theme. 
Addiction was a key category of this debate; for a discussion of the category of ‘lumpen’, 
see Denning, “Wageless Life.” One could see how the addiction camps are the postmodern 
equivalent of the lazzaretti and lazzaroni, the leper hospital and leper.
23.  Mehr, September 26, 2012, available at https://www.mehrnews.com/news/1608510/
24.  Iran, May 12, 2007.
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25.  Ethnographic observation while working as a research intern at the United Nations Office on 
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